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Abstract
Recent papers have demonstrated that ensemble
stumps and trees could be vulnerable to small in-
put perturbations, so robustness verification and
defense for those models have become an impor-
tant research problem. However, due to the struc-
ture of decision trees, where each node makes
decision purely based on one feature value, all
the previous works only consider the `∞ norm
perturbation. To study robustness with respect to
a general `p norm perturbation, one has to con-
sider the correlation between perturbations on dif-
ferent features, which has not been handled by
previous algorithms. In this paper, we study the
problem of robustness verification and certified
defense with respect to general `p norm perturba-
tions for ensemble decision stumps and trees. For
robustness verification of ensemble stumps, we
prove that complete verification is NP-complete
for p ∈ (0,∞) while polynomial time algorithms
exist for p = 0 or∞. For p ∈ (0,∞) we develop
an efficient dynamic programming based algo-
rithm for sound verification of ensemble stumps.
For ensemble trees, we generalize the previous
multi-level robustness verification algorithm to `p
norm. We demonstrate the first certified defense
method for training ensemble stumps and trees
with respect to `p norm perturbations, and verify
its effectiveness empirically on real datasets.
1. Introduction
It has been observed that small human-imperceptible per-
turbations can mislead a well-trained deep neural net-
work (Goodfellow et al., 2015; Szegedy et al., 2013), which
leads to extensive studies on robustness of deep neural net-
work models. In addition to strong attack methods that can
find adversarial perturbations in both white-box (Carlini &
Wagner, 2017; Madry et al., 2018; Chen et al., 2018; Zhang
et al., 2019a; Xu et al., 2019) and black-box settings (Chen
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et al., 2017; Ilyas et al., 2018; Brendel et al., 2018; Cheng
et al., 2019a; 2020), various algorithms have been proposed
for formal robustness verification (Katz et al., 2017; Gehr
et al., 2018; Zhang et al., 2018; Weng et al., 2018; Zhang
et al., 2019d; Wang et al., 2018b) and improving the robust-
ness of neural networks (Madry et al., 2018; Wong & Kolter,
2018; Wong et al., 2018; Zhang et al., 2019c;b).
In this paper, we consider the robustness of ensemble deci-
sion trees and stumps. Although tree based model ensem-
bles, including Gradient Boosting Trees (GBDT) (Friedman,
2001) and random forest, have been widely used in prac-
tice, their robustness properties have not been fully under-
stood. Recently, Cheng et al. (2019a); Chen et al. (2019a);
Kantchelian et al. (2016) showed that adversarial exam-
ples also exist in ensemble trees, and several recent works
considered the problem of robustness verification (Chen
et al., 2019b; Ranzato & Zanella, 2019; 2020; Törnblom
& Nadjm-Tehrani, 2019) and adversarial defense (Chen
et al., 2019a; Andriushchenko & Hein, 2019; Chen et al.,
2019e; Calzavara et al., 2019; 2020; Chen et al., 2019d)
for ensemble trees and stumps. However, most of these
works focus on evaluating and enhancing the robustness
for `∞ norm perturbations, while `p norm perturbations
with p <∞ were not considered. Since each node or each
stump makes decision by looking at only a single feature,
the perturbations are independent across features in `∞ ro-
bustness verification and defense for tree ensembles, which
makes the problem intrinsically simpler than the other `p
norm cases with p <∞. In fact, we will show that in some
cases verifying `p norm and `∞ norm belong to different
complexity classes – verifying `p norm robustness of an
ensemble decision stump is NP-complete for p ∈ (0,∞)
while polynomial time algorithms exist for p = 0,∞.
In practice, robustness on a single `∞ norm is not sufficient
– it has been demonstrated that an `∞ robust model can
still be vulnerable to invisible adversarial perturbations in
other `p norms (Schott et al., 2018; Tramèr & Boneh, 2019).
Additionally, there are cases where an `p norm threat model
is more suitable than `∞ norm. For instance, when the
perturbation can be made only to few features, it should
be modeled as an `0 norm perturbation. Thus, it is crucial
to have robustness verification and defense algorithms that
can work for general `p norms. In this paper, We give a
comprehensive study of this problem for tree based models.
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Table 1. Summary of the algorithms and their complexity for robustness verification of ensemble trees and stumps. Blue cells are the
contribution of this paper.
Verification method `∞ `0 `p, p ∈ (0,∞)
Single Tree complete Linear (Chen et al., 2019b) Linear (Sec 3.1) Linear (Sec 3.1)
Ensemble Stump complete Polynomial (Andriushchenko & Hein, 2019) Linearithmic (Sec 3.2) NP-complete (Sec 3.2)incomplete Not needed Not needed Approximate Knapsack (Sec 3.2)
Ensemble Tree complete NP-complete (Kantchelian et al., 2016)incomplete Multi-level (Chen et al., 2019b) Extended Multi-level (Sec 3.3)
Our contribution can be summarized as follows:
• In the first part of paper, we consider the problem of veri-
fying `p norm robustness of tree and stump ensembles. For
a single decision tree, similar to the `∞ norm case, we show
that the problem of complete robustness verification of `p
norm robustness can be done in linear time. However, for
ensemble decision stump, although complete `∞ norm veri-
fication can be done in polynomial time, it’s NP-complete
for verifying `p norm robustness when p ∈ (0,∞). We
then provide an efficient algorithm to conduct sound but
incomplete verification by dynamic programming. For tree
ensembles, the `p case is NP-complete for any p and we
propose an efficient algorithm for computing a reasonably
tight lower bound. Table 1 the algorithms proposed in our
paper and previous works, as well as their complexity.
• Based on the proposed robustness verification algorithms,
we develop training algorithms for ensemble stumps and
trees that can improve certified robust test errors with respect
to general `p norm perturbations. Experiments on multiple
datasets verify that the proposed methods can improve `p
norm robustness where the previous `∞ norm certified de-
fense (Andriushchenko & Hein, 2019) cannot.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section
2, we introduce the robustness verification and certified
defense problems. In Section 3, we discuss complexity and
algorithms for `p norm robustness verification for ensemble
stumps and trees. In Section 4, we show how to use our
proposed verification algorithms to train ensemble stumps
and trees with certified `p norm robustness. Experiments on
multiple datasets are conducted in Section 5.
2. Background and Related Work
Background Assume F : Rd → {1, . . . , C} is a C-way
classification model, given a correctly classified example
x0 with F (x0) = y0, an adversarial perturbation is defined
as δ ∈ Rd such that F (x0 + δ) 6= y0.
Definition 1 (Robustness Verification Problem). Given
F,x0 and a perturbation radius , the robustness verifi-
cation problem aims to determine whether there exists an
adversarial example within  ball around x0. Formally, we
determine whether the following statement is true:
F (x0 + δ) = y0, ∀‖δ‖p ≤ . (1)
Giving the exact “yes/no” answer to (1) is NP-complete
for neural networks (Katz et al., 2017) and tree ensem-
bles (Kantchelian et al., 2016). Adversarial attack algo-
rithms are developed to find an adverarial perturbation δ that
satisfies (1). For example, several widely used attacks have
been developed for attacking neural networks (Carlini &
Wagner, 2017; Madry et al., 2018; Goodfellow et al., 2015)
and other general classifiers (Cheng et al., 2019b; Chen
et al., 2019c). However, adversarial attacks can only find
adversarial examples which do not provide a sound safety
guarantee — even if an attack fails to find an adversarial
example, it does not imply no adversarial example exists.
Robustness verification algorithms aim to find a sound solu-
tion to (1) — they output yes for a subset of yes instances of
(1). However they may not be complete, in the sense that it
may not be able to answer yes for all the yes instances of (1).
Therefore we will refer solving (1) exactly as the “complete
verification problem”, while in general a verification algo-
rithm can be incomplete1 (providing a sound but incomplete
solution to (1)). Below we will review existing works on
verification and their connections to certified defense.
Robustness verification For neural network, it has been
shown complete verification is NP-complete for ReLU net-
works, so many recent works have been focusing on de-
veloping efficient (but incomplete) robustness verification
algorithms (Wong & Kolter, 2018; Zhang et al., 2018; Weng
et al., 2018; Singh et al., 2018; Wang et al., 2018b; Singh
et al., 2019; Dvijotham et al., 2018). Many of them fol-
low the linear or convex relaxation based approach (Salman
et al., 2019), where (1) is solved as an optimization problem
with relaxed constraints. However, since ensemble trees
are discrete step functions, none of these neural network
verification algorithms can be effectively applied.
Specialized algorithms are required for verifying tree en-
sembles. Kantchelian et al. (2016) first showed that com-
plete verification for ensemble tree is NP-complete when
1 In some works, incomplete verification is referred to as “approx-
imate” verification where the goal is to guarantee a lower bound
for the norm of the minimum adversarial example, or “relaxed”
verification emphasizing the relaxation techniques used to solving
an optimization problem related to (1).
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there are multiple trees with depth ≥ 2. An integer pro-
gramming method was proposed for complete verification
which requires exponential time. Later on, a single decision
tree is verified for evaluating robustness of an RL policy in
(Bastani et al., 2018). More recently, Chen et al. (2019b)
gave a comprehensive study on the robustness of tree en-
semble models; Ranzato & Zanella (2020) and Ranzato &
Zanella (2019) proposed a tree ensemble robustness and
stability verification method based on abstract interpreta-
tion; and Törnblom & Nadjm-Tehrani (2019) introduced an
abstraction-refinement procedure which iteratively refines
a partition of the input space. However, all these previous
works only consider `∞ perturbation model (i.e., setting the
norm to be ‖δ‖∞ in (1)). The `∞ norm assumption makes
verification much easier on decision trees and stumps as per-
turbations can be considered independently across features,
aligning with the decision procedure of tree based models.
Certified Defense Many approaches have been proposed
to improve the robustness of a classifier, however evaluat-
ing a defense method is often tricky. Many works evaluate
model robustness based on empirical robust accuracy, de-
fined as the percentage of correctly classified samples under
a specific set of attacks within a predefined threat model
(e.g., an `p -ball) (Madry et al., 2018; Chen et al., 2019a).
However, using such measurement can lead to a false sense
of robustness (Athalye et al., 2018), since robustness against
a specific kind of attack doesn’t give a sound solution to (1).
In fact, many proposed empirical defense algorithms were
broken under more sophisticated attacks (Athalye et al.,
2018; Tramer et al., 2020). Instead, certified adversarial
defense algorithms evaluate the classifier based on certified
robust accuracy, defined as the percentage of correctly
classified samples for which the robustness can be verified
within the  ball. Most of the certified defense algorithms
are based on finding the weights to minimize the certified
robust loss measured by some robustness verification algo-
rithms (Wong & Kolter, 2018; Wong et al., 2018; Wang
et al., 2018a; Mirman et al., 2018; Zhang et al., 2019b).
Several recent works studied robust tree based models. In
(Chen et al., 2019a), an adversarial training approach is
proposed to improve `∞ norm robustness of random forest
and GBDT. Chen et al. (2019e) proposed another empirical
defense also for `∞ norm robustness. The only certified
defense that can provide provable robustness guarantees is
given in (Andriushchenko & Hein, 2019), where they pro-
posed a boosting algorithm to improve the certified robust
error of ensemble trees and stumps with respect to `∞ norm
perturbation. This method cannot be directly extended to `p
norm perturbations since it relies on independence between
features: when one feature is perturbed, the perturbations of
other features are irrelevant.
3. `p-norm Robustness Verification of Stumps
and Trees
The robustness verification problem for ensemble trees and
stumps requires us to solve (1) given a model F (·). For
some of the cases, we will show that computing (1) exactly
(complete robustness verification) is NP-complete, so in
those cases we will propose efficient polynomial time algo-
rithms for computing a sound but incomplete solution to the
robustness verification problem.
Summary of our results For a single decision tree, Chen
et al. (2019b) shows that `∞ robustness can be evaluated in
linear time. We show that their algorithm can be extended
to the `p norm case for p ∈ [0,∞]. Furthermore, we can
also extend the multi-level `∞ verification framework (Chen
et al., 2019b) for tree ensembles to general `p cases, allow-
ing efficient and sound verification for general `p norm. For
evaluating the robustness of an ensemble decision stump,
Andriushchenko & Hein (2019) showed that the `∞ case can
be solved in polynomial time, but their algorithm uses the
fact that features are uncorrelated under `∞ norm perturba-
tions so cannot be used for any p <∞ case. We prove that
the `0 norm robustness evaluation can be done in linear time,
while for the `p norm case with p ∈ (0,∞), the robustness
verification problem is NP-complete. We then propose an
efficient dynamic programming algorithm to obtain a good
lower bound for verification.
3.1. A single decision tree
We first consider the simple case of a single decision tree.
Assume the decision tree has n leaf nodes and for a given
example xwith d features, starting from the root, x traverses
the intermediate tree levels until reaching a leaf node. Each
internal node i determines whether xwill be passed to left or
right child by checking I(xti > ηi), where ti is the feature
to spilt at in node i and ηi is the threshold. Each leaf node
vi has a value vi indicating the prediction value of the tree.
If we define Bi as the set of input x that can reach leaf node
i, due to the decision tree structure, Bi can be represented
as a d-dimensional box:
Bi = (li1, r
i
1]× · · · × (lid, rid]. (2)
Some of the l, r can be −∞ or +∞. As discussed in Sec-
tion 3.1 of (Chen et al., 2019b), the box can be computed
efficiently in linear time by traversing the tree. To certify
whether there exists any misclassified points under perturba-
tion ‖δ‖p ≤ , we can enumerate boxes for all n leaf nodes
and check the minimum distance from x0 to each box. The
following proposition shows that the `p norm distance be-
tween a point and a box can be computed in O(d) time,
and thus the complete robustness verification problem for a
single tree can be solved in O(dn) time.
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Proposition 1. Given a box B = (l1, r1] × · · · × (ld, rd]
and a point x ∈ Rd. The minimum `p distance (p ∈ [0,∞])
from x to B is ‖z − x‖p where:
zi =

xi, li ≤ xi ≤ ui
li, xi < li
ui, xi > ui.
(3)
We define the operator distp(B, x) to be the minimum `p
distance between x to a box B. We define the `p norm
ball Ballp(x, ) = {x′|‖x′ − x‖p ≤ }, and we use ∩ to
denote the intersection between a `p ball and a box. B ∩
Ballp(x, ) 6= ∅ if and only if distp(B, x) ≤ .
3.2. Ensemble decision stumps
A decision stump is a decision tree with only one root node
and two leaf nodes. We assume there are T decision stumps
and the i-th decision stump gives the prediction
f i(x) =
{
wil if xti < η
i
wir if xti ≥ ηi.
The prediction of a decision stump ensemble F (x) =∑
i f
i(x) can be decomposed into each feature in the fol-
lowing way. For each feature j, assume j1, . . . , jTj are
the decision stumps using feature j, we can collect all the
thresholds [ηj1 , . . . , ηjTj ]. Without loss of generality, as-
sume ηj1 ≤ · · · ≤ ηjTj then the prediction values assigned
in each interval can be denoted as
gj(xj) = v
jt if ηjt < xj ≤ ηjt+1 (4)
where
vjt = wj1l + · · ·+ wjtl + wjt+1r + · · ·+ w
jTj
r ,
and xj is the value of sample x on feature j. The overall pre-
diction can be written as the summation over the predicted
values of each feature:
F (x) =
d∑
j=1
gj(xj), (5)
and the final prediction is given by y = sgn(F (x)).
`0 ensemble stump verification Assume F (x) is origi-
nally positive and we want to make it as small as possible
by perturbing δ features (in this case, δ should be a positive
integer). For each feature j, we want to know the maximum
decrease of prediction value by changing this feature, which
can be computed as
cj = min
t
vjt − gj(xj), (6)
and we should choose δ features with smallest cj values to
perturb. Let Sδ denotes the set with δ smallest cj values, we
have
min
‖x−x‖0≤K
F (x) = F (x) +
∑
i∈SK
cj . (7)
Therefore verification can be done exactly inO(T+dlog(d))
time, where O(dlog(d)) is the cost of sorting d values
{c1, ..., cd}.
`p ensemble stump verification The difficulty of `p
norm robustness verification is that the perturbations on
each feature are correlated, so we can’t separate all the fea-
tures as in (Andriushchenko & Hein, 2019) for the `∞ norm
case. In the following, we prove that the complete `p norm
verification is NP-complete by showing a reduction from
Knapsack to `p norm ensemble stump verification. This
shows that `p norm verification can belong to a different
complexity class compared to the `∞ norm case.
Theorem 1. Solving `p norm robustness verification (with
soundness and completeness) as in Eq. (1) for an ensemble
decision stumps is NP-complete when p ∈ (0,∞).
Proof. We show that a 0-1 Knapsack problem can be re-
duced to an ensemble stump verification problem. A 0-
1 Knapsack problem can be defined as follows. Assume
there are T items each with weight wi and value vi, the
(decision version of) 0-1 Knapsack problem aims to deter-
mine whether there exists a subset of items S such that∑
i∈S wi ≤ C and with value
∑
i∈S vi ≥ D.
Now we construct a decision stump verification problem
with T features and T stumps from the 0-1 Knapsack prob-
lem, where each decision stump corresponds to one feature.
Assume x is the original example, we define each decision
stump to be
gi(s) = −viI(s > ηi) + D
T
, where ηi = xi + w
(1/p)
i ,
(8)
where I(·) is the indicator function. The goal is to ver-
ify `p robustness with  = C(1/p). We need to show
that this robustness verification problem outputs YES
(min‖x−x′‖p≤
∑
i g
i(x′i) < 0) if and only if the Knap-
sack solution is also YES. If the verification found v∗ =
min‖x−x‖p≤
∑
i g
i(x′i) < 0, let x be the corresponding
solution of verification, then we can choose the following S
for 0-1 Knapsack:
S = {i | xi > ηi} (9)
It is guaranteed that∑
i∈S
wi =
∑
i∈S
|ηi−xi|p ≤
∑
i
|x′i−xi|p ≤ p = C (10)
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and by the definition of gi we have
∑
i g
i(x′i) = D −∑
i∈S vi ≤ 0, so this subset S will also be feasible for the
Knapsack problem. On the other hand, if the 0-1 Knap-
sack problem has a solution S, for robustness verification
problem we can choose x′ such that
xi =
{
ηi if i ∈ S
xi otherwise
By definition we have
∑
i g
i(x′i) = D −
∑
i∈S vi < 0.
Therefore the Knapsack problem, which is NP-complete,
can be reduced to `p norm decision stump verification prob-
lem with any p ∈ (0,∞) in polynomial time.
Incomplete Verification for `p robustness Although
itâA˘Z´s impossible to solve `p verification for decision
stumps in polynomial time, we show sound verification
can be done in polynomial time by dynamic programming,
inspired by the pseudo-polynomial time algorithm for Knap-
sack.
Let ηj1 , . . . , ηjTj be the thresholds for feature j and
vj1 , . . . , vjTj be the corresponding values, our dynamic pro-
gramming maintains the following value for each : “given
maximal  perturbation to the first j features, what’s the
minimal prediction of the perturbed x”. We denote this
value as D(, j), then the following recursion holds:
D(, j + 1) = min
δ∈[0,]
D(− δ, j) + C(δ, j + 1),
where C(δ, j + 1) := min|x′j−xj |<δ g
j(x′j) which can be
pre-computed. Note that δ,  can be real numbers so exactly
running this DP requires exponential time. Our approx-
imate algorithm allows , δ only up to certain precision.
If we choose precision ν, then we only consider values
ν, 2ν, . . . , Pν (the smallest P with Pν > ). To ensure the
verification algorithm is sound, the recursion will become
D˜(aν, j+1) = min
b∈{1,...,a}
D˜((a−b+1)ν, j)+C(bν, j+1),
(11)
and the final solution should be D˜(de, d) where de := Pν
means rounding  up to the closest grid. Note that the +1
term in the recursion is to ensure that the resulting value
is a lower bound of the original solution. The verification
algorithm can verify a sample in O(Pd+T ) time , in which
d is dimension and P is the number of discretizations.
3.3. `p norm verification for ensemble decision trees
Kantchelian et al. (2016) showed that for general ensemble
trees, complete `∞ robustness verification can formulated
as a mixed integer linear programming problem, which is
NP-Complete, and Chen et al. (2019b) proposed a fast poly-
nomial time hierarchical verification framework to verify
the model to a desired precision. For a tree ensemble with T
trees and an input example x, Chen et al. (2019b) first check
all the leaf nodes of each tree and only keep the leaf nodes
that x can reach under the given perturbation. In the `∞
case, both the perturbation ball of x and the decision bound-
ary of a leaf node can be represented as boxes (see Sec. 3.1),
therefore it is easy to check whether the two boxes have an
intersection. Then T trees are splited into TK groups, each
with K trees. Trees from different groups are considered
independently; the K trees within a group form a graph
where each size-K clique in this graph represents a possible
prediction value of all trees within this group given `∞ in-
put perturbation. Enumerating all size-K cliques allows us
to obtain the worst case prediction of the K trees within a
group, and then we can combine the worst case predictions
of all TK groups (e.g., directly adding all of them) to obtain
an over-estimated worst case prediction of the entire ensem-
ble. The results can be tightened by considering each group
as a “virtual tree” and merge virtual trees into a new level
of groups.
The most important procedure in (Chen et al., 2019b) is to
check whether a set of leaf nodes from different trees within
a group can form a valid size-K clique, which involves
checking the intersections among the decision boundaries of
leaf nodes from different trees and the intersection among
the clique and the perturbation ball. We extend this proce-
dure to `p setting in our work following two steps:
First, we check the intersection between input perturbation
Ballp(x, ) and a box Bi using Proposition 1. Initially, we
only consider the set of leaf node that has distp(Bi,x) ≤ 
(Bi is the decision boundary of a leaf).
Second, in `∞ case, since the `∞ perturbation ball is also a
box, it is possible to use the boxicity property to obtain in-
tersections which are represented as size-K cliques in Chen
et al. (2019b).This boxicity property is not hold anymore for
general `p input perturbations. Chen et al. (2019b) showed
that for a set of `∞ boxes {B1, . . . , BT }, if Bi ∩ Bj 6= ∅
for all i, j (i 6= j), and Bi ∩ Ball∞(x, ) 6= ∅ for all i,
then it guarantees that B1 ∩B2... ∩BT ∩ Ball∞(x, ) 6= ∅.
However, for `p (p 6= ∞) norm perturbation, under the
same condition cannot guarantee that B1 ∩ B2... ∩ BT ∩
Ballp(x, ) 6= ∅. In fact, even if Ballp(x, ) ∩ Bt 6= ∅ for
any t, B1 ∩B2...∩BT ∩Ball∞(x, ) can still be empty. A
counter example with `1 is shown in Figure 1 and similar
counter examples can be found for any p <∞.
Therefore, we need to check whether B¯ := B1 ∩ · · · ∩BT ,
which is still a box, has nonempty intersection with input
perturbation Ballp(x, ). This step can be computed using
Proposition 1, which costs O(d) time. After this additional
procedure, we can safely generalize the `∞ framework to
`p(p ≥ 0) cases by simply replacing the procedure. We
include the detail algorithm for enumerating the size-K
cliques in Appendix 1.
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Figure 1. In the `p case, the perturbation ball is not a box and the
general `p version of the Lemma 1 in (Chen et al., 2019b) is not
true. Here we present a counter example in `1.
4. Training `p-robust Boosted Stumps and
Trees
Based on the general `p verification algorithm for stump
ensembles described in Section 3.2, we develop certified
defense algorithms for training ensemble stumps and trees.
The main challenge is that for `p(p > 0), different from the
`∞ case, the correlation between features should be con-
sidered. Following the setting in (Andriushchenko & Hein,
2019), we use an exponential loss function L, where for a
point (x, y) ∈ Rd × {−1, 1}, L(yf(x)) = exp (−yf(x)).
However, our algorithms can be generalized to other strictly
monotonic and convex loss functions. We consider each
training example (x, y) ∈ S is perturbed in Ballp(x, ), S is
the training set.
4.1. `p robust boosted stumps
Given a decision stump ensemble F (x) =
∑T
i=1 fi(x) with
T stumps, without loss of generality, we assume the first
T − 1 stumps, defined as FT−1(x) =
∑T−1
i=1 fi(x), are
already trained and fixed, and our target is to update F
with a new stump fT (x). Here we define a stump as f(x) =
wl+1xj≥bwr which splits the space at threshold b on feature
j and predict wl (left leaf prediction) or wl + wr (right leaf
prediction). Our goal is to select the 4 parameters (b, j, wl,
wr) robustly by minimizing the minimax loss:
min
j,b,wl,wr
∑
(x,y)∈S
max
‖δ‖p≤
L(yF (x+ δ)) (12)
To solve this optimization, we first consider a sub-problem
which finds the optimal w∗r and w
∗
l for a fixed split (j
′, b′).
w∗l , w
∗
r = arg min
wl,wr
∑
(x,y)∈S
max
‖δ‖p≤
L(yF (x+ δ))
s.t. j = j′, b = b′
(13)
For the inner maximization, we note that the loss function
is monotonically decreasing, therefore we can replace the
maximization as an minimization inside the loss function:
max
‖δ‖p≤
L(yF (x+ δ))
= max
‖δ‖p≤
L (yFT−1(x+ δ) + yfT (x+ δ))
= L
(
min
‖δ‖p≤
(yFT−1(x+ δ) + yfT (x+ δ))
)
= L
(
min
‖δ‖p≤
(yFT−1(x+ δ) + ywl + ywr1xj′+δj′≥b′)
)
The inner minimization can then be considered as a stump
ensemble verification problem. According to Section 3.2,
for each x, we can derive a lower bound of the inner mini-
mization, denoted as D˜(de, d):
min
‖δ‖p≤
(yFT−1(x+ δ) + ywl + ywr1xj′+δj′≥b′)
≥ D˜(x,y)(de, d).
For simplicity, we omit subscript (x, y) in the analysis below.
Our goal is to give D˜(de, d) as a function of wl and wr.
This requires a small extension to the DP based verification
algorithm. In (11), we can consider the d features in any
order. We can solve the DP by first solving all other d −
1 features except j′, and obtain D˜\j′(aν, j) for all a ∈
{1, · · · , P} and j ∈ {1, · · · .d − 1} (we denote the DP
table as D˜\j′ to emphasize that it does not include feature
j′). D˜\j′(aν, d − 1) is a lower bound of the minimum
prediction value under perturbation aν excluding all stumps
involving feature j′. Then, the recursion for D˜(de, d) needs
to consider the minimum of two settings, representing the
left or right leaf is selected for the last stump:
D˜(de, d)=min
(
D˜L(de, d), D˜R(de, d)
)
D˜L(de,d)= min
a∈[P ]
(
D˜\j′((P−a+1)ν, d−1)+CL(aν, j′)
)
+ywl
D˜R(de, d) = min
a∈[P ]
(
D˜\j′((P−a+1)ν, d−1)+CR(aν, j′)
)
+y(wr+wl)
CL(aν, j) = min|xj−x′j |≤aν,x′j<b′
gj(x′)
CR(aν, j) = min|xj−x′j |≤aν,x′j≥b′
gj(x′) (14)
In (14), D˜L(de,d) and D˜R(de,d) denote the minimum pre-
diction value of the sample (x, y) when perturbed into the
left or right side of the split (j′, b′). CL(aν, j), CR(aν, j)
denote the minimum prediction when x is perturbed into the
left or right side of the split on feature j with perturbation
aν, where gj(x) is defined as in (4) but with the last tree
fT (x) excluded (i.e., computed on FT−1).
After obtaining the lower bound of the inner minimization,
instead of solving the original optimization (13), here we
solve
w∗l , w
∗
r = arg min
wl,wr
∑
(x,y)∈S
L(D˜(x,y)(de, d)). (15)
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Theorem 2.
∑
(x,y)∈S L(D˜(x,y)(de, d)) defined in (15) is
jointly convex in wl, wr.
The proof can be found in the Appendix D. Based on this
theorem, we can use coordinate descent to solve the mini-
mization: fix wr and minimize over wl, then fix wl and min-
imize over wr (similar to Andriushchenko & Hein (2019)).
For exponential loss, when wr is fixed, we can use a closed
form solution to update wl (see Appendix B). When wl is
fixed, we use bisection to get the optimal wr. For general
loss functions, both wl and wr can be solved by bisection.
After estimating w∗l , w
∗
r in (13), we can iterate over all the
possible split positions (j, b) and select the position with
minimum robust loss. Our proposed general `p norm ro-
bust training algorithm for stump ensembles can train a new
stump inO(TN(Pd+T )+dBT ) time, whereB is the num-
ber of candidate bs and N is the size of dataset. For fixed
j,  and precision, D˜\j′(aν, d− 1) is fixed for all a ∈ [P ]
and can be pre-calculated, which costsO(N(Pd+T )) time.
And in implementation, we only need to calculate T + 1
different D˜\j′(aν, d − 1), which costs O(TN(Pd + T ))
time. After obtaining D˜\j′(aν, d − 1), in each iteration,
D˜(de, d) can be derived in O(T ) time (despite having P
discretizations, there are only T possible values in the mini-
mization in Eq. (14), and an efficient implementation can
exploit this fact). The bisection searching for w∗l and w
∗
r
can also be finished in O(1) time with fixed parameters.
Thus the above algorithm can train a stump ensemble in
O(TN(Pd+ T ) + dBT ) time.
4.2. `p robust boosted trees
Single decision tree Our goal is to solve (12) where F is a
single tree. Different from the `∞ case, in `p cases, perturba-
tion on one dimension can reduce the possible perturbation
on other dimensions. Therefore, when updating a stump en-
semble, perturbation bound will be consumed along the tra-
jectory from the tree root to leaf nodes. Because the number
of features is typically more than the depth of a decision tree,
we use each feature only once along one trajectory on the de-
cision tree. We define S = {(x, y) ∈ S|distp(x,BNk) ≤ }
as the set of samples that can fall into node Nk under `p
norm  bounded perturbation, and (N0, N1, ..., Nk−1) as
the sequence of nodes on the trajectory from tree root N0 to
tree node Nk. Each node Nt (0 ≤ t < k) contains a split
(jt, bt) which splits the space on feature jt at value bt.
In the `p norm case, each example has an unique pertur-
bation budget at node Nk, as some of the perturbation
budget has been consumed in parent nodes splitting other
features. For each sample (x, y), `p norm bounded pertur-
bation in node Nk can be calculated along the trajectory
by (x) = (p −∑t∈E(xjt − bt)p) 1p , where E is a sub-
set of the node trajectory in which x and Nt+1 are on the
different sides of node Nt, ∀t ∈ E. Formally, we can de-
fine E as {t : t < k − 1,1(xjt ≥ bt) 6= 1(Nt+1 ≥ bt)},
where Nt+1 ≥ bt denotes that x′jt ≥ bt, ∀x′ ∈ BNt+1 .
This is different from previous works on `∞ perturbations.
Now we consider training the node Nk and get the optimal
parameters (j∗, b∗, w∗l , w
∗
r):
j∗, b∗, w∗l , w
∗
r
= arg min
j,b,wl,wr
∑
(x,y)∈S
max
‖δ‖p≤(x)
L(f(x+ δ)y), (16)
where f(·) is a new leaf node f(x) = I(x ≥ b)wr + wl,
and when training node Nk, we only consider the training
examples in S. The objective in (16) is similar to that in (12)
except that there is only one stump to be trained. Therefore,
we can use a similar procedure as in previous section to find
the optimal parameters.
Boosted decision tree ensemble Given a tree ensemble
with T trees F (x) =
∑T
i=1 fi(x), we fix the first T − 1
trees and train a node N on the (T )-th decision tree fT (x).
The optimization problem will be essentially the same as
Eq. (16), but here for (x, y) ∈ S, we should also consider
the first T − 1 trees, along with prediction of node N :
max
‖δ‖p≤(x)
L(yFT (x+ δ))
= max
‖δ‖p≤(x)
L(yFT−1(x+ δ)+y(wl+1xj+δj≥bwr))
=L
(
min
‖δ‖p≤(x)
(yFT−1(x+ δ)+y(wl+1xj+δj≥bwr))
)
.
Here FT−1(x) is the prediction from the ensemble of the
first T − 1 trees. We further lower bound the minimization:
min
‖δ‖p≤(x)
(yFT−1(x+ δ)+y(wl+1xj+δj≥bwr))
≥ min
‖δ‖p≤(x)
yFT−1(x+ δ)+ min‖δ‖p≤(x)
y(wl+1xj+δj≥bwr)
The first part is the `p robustness verification for tree en-
semble, which is challenging to solve efficiently during
training time. Here we apply a relatively loose lower bound
of yFT−1(x), where
T−1∑
i=1
min
‖δ‖p≤(x)
(yf(x+ δ)) ≤ min
‖δ‖p≤(x)
yFT−1(x)
We simply sum up the worst prediction on each previous
tree, which can be easily maintained during training. By
doing this relaxation, the problem is reduced to building a
single tree to boost the `p norm robustness.
4.3.  schedule
When features are correlated in `p cases, we find that it is
important to have an  schedule during the training process
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Table 2. General `p-norm ensemble stump verification. This table reports verified test error (verified err.) and average per sample
verification time (avg. time) of each method. For our proposed DP based verification, precision is also reported. For `0 verification, we
report verified errors with 0 = 1 (changing 1 pixels). For `0 norm, we also report r∗, which is the average the number features that can
be perturbed at most while the prediction stays the same.
Dataset `1 MILP (complete) Ours `1 DP approx. (incomplete) Ours vs. MILP Ours `0 (complete) verification
name ∞ verified err. avg. time precision verified err. avg. time MILP/ours speedup avg. robust r∗ verified err. avg. time
breast-cancer 0.3 10.94% .030s 0.01 10.94% .00025s 1.00 120X .04 95.62% .0006s
diabetes 0.05 35.06% .017s 0.0002 35.06% .0004s 1.00 40X .0 100.0% .0005s
Fashion-MNIST shoes 0.1 10.45% .105s 0.005 10.55% .0013s .99 80.8X 2.09 16.35% .010s
MNIST 1 vs. 5 0.3 3.30% 0.11s 0.005 3.35% 0.0013s 1.00 71X 3.33 4.50% .010s
MNIST 2 vs. 6 0.3 9.64% 0.099s 0.005 9.69% .0012s .98 82X 1.22 26.43% .012s
Table 3. General `p-norm tree ensemble verification. We report verified test error (verified err.) and average per-example verification
time (avg. time) of each method. K: size of cliques; L: number of levels in multi-level verification (defined similarly as in (Chen et al.,
2019b)). Our `p incomplete verification can obtain results very close to complete verification (MILP), with huge speedups.
Dataset `1 MILP Ours `1 approx. Ours vs. MILP
name  verified err. avg. time K L verified err. avg. time ratio of verified err. speedup
breast-cancer 0.3 8.03% .036s 3 2 8.03% .012s 1.00 3X
diabetes 0.05 33.12% .027s 3 2 33.12% .012s 1.00 2.25X
Fashion-MNIST shoes 0.1 10% .091s 3 2 10% .011s 1.00 8.23X
MNIST 1 vs. 5 0.3 4.20% 0.088s 3 2 4.20% .011s 1.00 8X
MNIST 2 vs. 6 0.3 8.60% .098s 3 2 8.80% .012s .98 8.17X
– the  increases gradually from small to large, instead of
using a fixed large  in the beginning. If one directly uses a
large  in the beginning, the first few stumps will allow too
much perturbation and the later stumps tend to allow fewer
perturbation, making it harder to explore the correlation
between features. In ensemble stump training, we increase
the  when training a new stump, and in ensemble tree
training, we increase the  when height of the tree grows.
We also include the choice of  schedules in Appendix D.1.
5. Experimental Results
In this section we empirically test the proposed algo-
rithms for `p robustness verification and training. The
code is implemented in Python and all the experiments
are conducted on a machine with 2.7 GHz Intel Core
i5 CPU with 8G RAM. Our code is publicly available
at https://github.com/YihanWang617/On-ell_p-Robustness-
of-Ensemble-Stumps-and-Trees
5.1. `p stump and tree ensemble verification
`p stump ensemble verification We evaluate our incom-
plete `p verification method for stump ensembles on five
real datasets. Ensembles are robustly trained using the `∞
training procedure proposed in (Andriushchenko & Hein,
2019), each of which contains 20 stumps.
For the `1 norm robustness verification problem, we have
shown it’s NP-complete to conduct complete verification.
To demonstrate the tightness and efficiency of the proposed
Dynamic Programming (DP) based verification, we also
run the Mixed Integer Linear Programming (Kantchelian
et al., 2016) to conduct complete verification, which can take
exponential time. In Table 2, we can find that the proposed
DP algorithm gives almost exactly the same bound as MILP,
while being 50− 100 times faster. This speedup guarantees
its further applications in certified robust training.
For the `0 norm robustness verification, we propose a lin-
earithmic time algorithm for complete verification. The
results for 0 = 1 (changing only 1 feature) are also re-
ported in Table 2. We can observe that the proposed method
can conduct complete verification in less than 0.1 second.
We find that some models are not robust to `0 perturbations
with high verified errors. Since our verification method is
complete, these models suffer from adversarial examples
that change classification outcome by changing only 1 pixel.
`p tree ensemble verification We evaluate our incom-
plete `p verification method for tree ensembles on five
real datasets. Ensemble models being verified are robustly
trained with (Andriushchenko & Hein, 2019), each of which
contains 20 trees.
Again, we compare our proposed algorithm with MILP-
based complete verification (Kantchelian et al., 2016) which
can take exponential time to get the exact bound. The results
are presented in Table 3, and parameters of the proposed
method (K and L) are also reported. We observe that the
proposed verification method gets very tight verified errors
while being much faster than the MILP solver.
On `p-norm Robustness of Ensemble Decision Stumps and Trees
Table 4. `1 robust training for stump ensembles. We report standard errors and `1 verified errors of our training methods (`1 training)
versus the previous `∞ training algorithm.  is the perturbation bound for each dataset. For  = 1.0 in mnist dataset, we train the models
using ∞ = 0.3. Our proposed `1 training can significantly reduce the `1 verified error, and the previous `∞ approach cannot as it was
designed to reduce `∞ error only. We conduct a similar experiment for `2 norm in Appendix E.2.
Dataset standard training `∞ training(Andriushchenko & Hein, 2019) `1 training (ours)
name ∞ 1 n. stumps standard err. verified err. standard err. verified err. standard err. verified err.
breast-cancer 0.3 1.0 20 0.73% 95.62% 4.37% 99.27% 1.46% 35.77%
diabetes 0.05 0.05 20 21.43% 37.66% 29.2% 35.06% 27.27% 31.82%
Fashion-MNIST shoes 0.1 0.1 20 6.60% 69.85% 7.50% 10.45% 7.10% 10.35%0.2 0.5 40 5.05% 87.5% 9.25% 57.05% 12.40% 32.20%
MNIST 1 vs. 5 0.3 0.3 20 1.23% 58.76% 1.68% 3.30% 1.28% 2.81%0.3 1.0 40 0.59% 66.01% 1.33% 17.46% 4.49% 16.23%
MNIST 2 vs. 6 0.3 0.3 20 3.17% 92.46% 4.52% 9.64% 3.71% 8.24%0.3 1.0 40 2.81% 99.49% 3.91% 44.22% 7.73% 33.46%
Table 5. `1 robust training for tree ensembles. We report standard and `1 robust test error for all the three methods. We also report  for
each dataset, and the number of trees in each ensemble. We also report the results of `2 robust training for tree ensembles in Appendix E.2.
Dataset standard training `∞ training (Andriushchenko & Hein, 2019) `1 training (ours)
name ∞ 1 n. trees depth standard err. verified err. standard err. verified err. standard err. verified err.
Fashion-MNIST shoes 0.2 0.5 5 5 4.65% 99.85% 7.85% 89.54% 18.71% 65.18%
breast-cancer 0.3 1.0 5 5 0.73% 99.26% 0.73% 99.63% 9.56% 47.05%
MNIST 1 vs. 5 0.3 0.8 5 5 0.64% 97.38% 0.64% 64.11% 4.59% 36.23%
MNIST 2 vs. 6 0.3 0.6 5 5 4.12% 100.0% 1.96% 52.33% 7.64% 39.67%
5.2. `p robust stump and tree ensemble training
`p robust stump training We evaluate our proposed certi-
fied training methods on two small size datasets and three
medium-size datasets. All the models are trained with stan-
dard training, `∞ robust training (Andriushchenko & Hein,
2019) and our proposed general `p robust training algorithm
(in experiments, we set p = 1. We also report the p = 2
results in Appendix E.2). Models of the same dataset are
trained with the same set of hyperparameters (details can
be found in the Appendix). We evaluate `1 verified test
error using MILP. In our experiments, we choose different
∞ and p such that the `∞ and `p perturbation balls do
not contain each other. Standard error and verified robust
test error of each model are reported in Table 4. We also
report `∞ robustness of these models in Appendix E.1. We
observe that the proposed training method can successfully
get a more robust model against `1 perturbation compared
to the previous `∞-norm only training method.
`p robust tree training We evaluate our `p robust training
method for trees on subsets of three medium size datasets
(dataset statistics can be found in the Appendix). We report
the results of `1 robust training tree ensembles in Tables 5,
and results of `2 robust training in Appendix E.2. It shows
that our algorithm achieves better or at least comparable
verified error in most cases. In addition, we also conduct an
example to test the performance of certified training with
respect to number of trees. In Figure 2, we compare `∞
and `1 robust training on fashion-mnist dataset and monitor
Figure 2. `1 and `∞ robust training on fashion-mnist dataset
(∞ = 0.2 and 1 = 0.5). We compare verified errors during
training when the number of stumps increases.
the performance over the first 20 stumps (the  scheduling
length is 5). We can observe that when number of stumps
increases, the our `1 robust training can indeed gradually
reduce `1 verified test error, where the `∞ robust training
(as a reference) can only slightly improve `1 robustness.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we first develop methods to efficiently ver-
ify the general `p norm robustness for tree-based ensemble
models. Based on our proposed efficient verification algo-
rithms proposed, we further derive the first `p norm certified
robust training algorithms for ensemble stumps and trees.
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A. Proof of Proposition 1
Proposition 1. Given a box B = (l1, r1]× · · · × (ld, rd] and a point x ∈ Rd. The closest `p distance (p ∈ [0,∞]) from x
to B is ‖z − x‖p where:
zi =

xi, li ≤ xi ≤ ui
li, xi < li
ui, xi > ui.
Proof. For p > 0, The goal is to minimize the following objective:
min
z
‖z − x‖pp = min
z
d∑
i=1
|zi − xi|p
s.t. li < zi ≤ ri, ∀i ∈ [d].
And for p = 0, the objective is
min
z
‖z − x‖0 = min
z
d∑
i=1
I(zi 6= xi)
s.t. li < zi ≤ ri, ∀i ∈ [d].
where I(·) is an indicator function. For p =∞, the objective is
min
z
‖z − x‖∞ = min
z
d∑
i=1
|zi − xi|
s.t. li < zi ≤ ri, ∀i ∈ [d].
Since each term in the summation is separable, we can consider minimizing each term in the summation signs separately.
Given the constraints on zi, the minimum is achieved at the condition specified in Eq. (3) regardless of the choice of p:
zi =

xi, li ≤ xi ≤ ui
li, xi < li
ui, xi > ui.
B. Closed form update rule for `p Stump Ensemble Training
For exponential loss we can rewrite eq (15) as
N−1∑
i=1
L(D˜(de, d)) =
N−1∑
i=1
γi exp(−yiwl)
=
∑
yi=1
γi exp(−wl)+
∑
yi=−1
γi exp(wl)
where
γi = L(D˜(de, d)− yiwl)
which is fixed with a fixed wr.
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And we can further derive the optimal wl at each update step∑
yi=1
γi(− exp(−w∗l )) +
∑
yi=−1
γi exp(w
∗
l ) = 0∑
yi=1
γi exp(−w∗l ) =
∑
yi=−1
γi exp(w
∗
l )
w∗l = ln
∑
yi=1
γi∑
yi=−1 γi
/2.
C. Robustness verification for ensemble trees
In this section, we provide the detail algorithm of robustness verification for ensemble trees. This algorithm is based
on the robustness verification framework in (Chen et al., 2019b). In Algorithm 1, we describe the modified function
CliqueEnumerate, which is the key procedure of this framework. The main difference is that after we form the initial
set of cliques, we will recheck whether the formed cliques have intersection with the `p perturbation ball (line 18 to 22).
D. Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. By definition, we have
L(D˜(de, d)) = L(min(D˜L(de,d), D˜R(de,d)))
= max(L(D˜L(de,d)), L(D˜R(de,d))).
Exponential loss L is convex and monotonically increasing; L(D˜L(de,d)) and L(D˜R(de,d)) are both jointly convex in
wl, wr. Note that the dynamic programming related terms become constants after they are computed, so they are irrelevant
to wl, wr. Therefore, L(D˜(de, d)) and further
∑N−1
i=0 L(D˜(de, d)) are jointly convex in wl, wr.
Dataset ensemble stumps lr. ensemble trees lr. `1 trainingensemble trees sample size
breast-cancer 0.4 - -
diabetes 0.4 - -
Fashion-MNIST shoes 0.4 1.0 5000
MNIST 1 vs. 5 0.4 1.0 5000
MNIST 2 vs. 6 0.4 1.0 5000
Table 6. Detail settings of the experiments. Here we report the learning rate of different training methods for ensemble stumps and trees.
We also report the sample size in experiments for ensemble tree training and the scheduling length in `p robust training for ensemble
stumps.
D.1. Detail settings of the experiments
Here we report the detail settings of our experiments in Table 6. For most of the experiments, we follow the learning rate
settings in (Andriushchenko & Hein, 2019). For  scheduling length, we empirically set to the best value near p/std for
each dataset and  settings (e.g., for `1 norm training, the best schedule length is among 2, 3 and 4 epochs for 1 = 1.0 and
std = 0.3). Here the std is ∞ used in (Andriushchenko & Hein, 2019). For each dataset, different methods are trained
with the same group of parameters.
For `1 robust training for ensemble trees, we use a subsample of training datasets to reduce training time. On Fashion-MNIST
shoes, MNIST 1 vs. 5 and MNIST 2 vs. 6 datasets, we subsample 5000 images of the selected classes from the original
dataset. For `2 robust training, we subsample 1000 images of the selected classes from the original dataset.
D.2. `∞ vs. `p robust training
For a binary classifier y = sgn(F (x)), and a fixed , we have min‖δ‖p≤ yF (x+ δ) ≥ min‖δ‖∞≤ yF (x+ δ). Therefore,
the exact `∞ robust loss can be a natural upper bound of `p robust loss. This explains the close result from `∞ and `p robust
training, when using the same . However, this `∞ upper bound tends to hurt the clean accuracy , which we can see from
Table 4. Additionally, unlike `1 or `2 norms, it is impossible to set this `∞ perturbation to a large value (e.g., ∞ = 1.0).
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E. Additional experiment results
E.1. Comparison of `∞ robustness
In this section, we report the `∞ verified errors of models in Table 4. For each model in the table, we verify the models
using `∞ robustness verification of decision stumps (Andriushchenko & Hein, 2019) with perturbation norm ∞. In general,
Andriushchenko & Hein (2019) produces better `∞ norm verification error because it is designed for that case, but when
training using our `1 robust training procedure with a larger `1, models also get relatively good `∞ robustness. Note that
here we train different number of stumps for different 1(e.g. For MNIST dataset, we train 20 stumps for 1 = 0.3 and 40
stumps for 1 = 1.0). And for a fixed , we train the `∞ robust model with the same number of stumps with other methods
when making comparisons.
Dataset standard training `∞ training `1 training
name ∞ 1 `∞ verified err. `∞ verified err. `∞ verified err.
breast-cancer 0.3 1.0 88.32% 10.94% 17.51%
diabetes 0.05 0.05 42.85% 35.06% 31.81%
Fashion-MNIST shoes 0.1 0.1 69.85% 11.35% 11.75%0.2 0.5 98.85% 19.30% 27.60%
MNIST 1 vs. 5 0.3 0.3 67.09% 4.09% 4.05%0.3 1.0 66.20% 3.60% 11.59%
MNIST 2 vs. 6 0.3 0.3 97.74% 8.63% 9.10%0.3 1.0 100.0% 8.69% 15.28%
Table 7. `∞ robustness of ensemble decision stumps. This table reports the `∞ robustness for the same set of models in Table 4. For
each dataset, we evaluate standard models, the `∞ robust models trained using (Andriushchenko & Hein, 2019) with perturbation norm
∞, and our `p robust model with p = 1 and perturbation norm 1. We test the models with `∞ norm perturbation ∞. Standard test
errors are omitted as they as the same as in Table 4.
E.2. `2 robust training
In Section 5 we mainly presented results for the p = 1 setting, however our robust training procedure works for general
`p norm. In this section, we show some `2 robust training results. For each dataset, we train three models using standard
training, `∞ robust training (Andriushchenko & Hein, 2019) with `∞ perturbation norm ∞, and `p robust training with
p = 2 and `2 perturbation norm 2. And in Table 8 and 9, we report the verification results of these models from `2
verification.
Dataset standard training `∞ training `2 training
name ∞ 2 standard err. `2 verified err. standard err. `2 verified err. standard err. `2 verified err.
breast-cancer 0.3 0.7 0.73% 97.08% 4.37% 99.27% 8.76% 39.42%
Fashion-MNIST shoes 0.2 0.4 5.05% 69.85% 9.25% 81.05% 14.55% 49.55%
MNIST 1 vs. 5 0.3 0.8 0.59% 67.09% 1.33% 66.45% 4.44% 36.56%
MNIST 2 vs. 6 0.3 0.8 2.81% 97.74% 3.91% 85.52% 13.67% 76.98%
Table 8. `2 robust training for ensemble stumps In this table, we train the model with p = 2 and compare the results with `∞ trained
models. For each dataset, we train three models using standard training, `∞ norm robust training with ∞ and `2 norm robust training
with 2. And we test and compare the `2 robustness of these models using `2 robust verification.
Dataset standard training `∞ training (Andriushchenko & Hein, 2019) `2 training (ours)
name ∞ 2 n. trees depth standard err. verified err. standard err. verified err. standard err. verified err.
Fashion-MNIST shoes 0.2 0.4 3 5 8.05% 99.40% 7.65% 93.49% 17.36% 68.23%
breast-cancer 0.3 0.8 5 5 1.47% 97.06% 1.47% 97.79% 12.50% 55.88%
MNIST 1 vs. 5 0.3 0.8 3 5 2.37% 100.0% 2.12% 97.72% 23.25% 50.54%
MNIST 2 vs. 6 0.3 0.8 3 5 3.82% 100.0% 3.12% 100.0% 19.80% 93.56%
Table 9. `2 robust training for tree ensembles. We report standard and `2 robust test error for all the three methods. We also report ∞
and 2 for each dataset, and the number of trees in each ensemble.
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Algorithm 1 Enumerating all K-cliques on a K-partite graph with p, dimension d and example x
input :V1, V2, , . . . , VK are the K independent sets (“parts”) of a K-partite graph; the graph is defined similarly as in
Chen et al. (2019b).
1 for k ← 1, 2, 3, . . . , K do
2 Uk ← {(Ai, Bi(k))|i(k) ∈ Vk, Ai = {i(k)}} /* U is a set of tuples (A,B), which stores a
set of cliques and their corresponding boxes. A is the set of nodes in one clique
and B is the corresponding box of this clique. Initially, each node in Vk forms a
1-clique itself. */
3 end
4 CliqueEnumerate(U1, U2, , . . . , UK)
5 Function CliqueEnumerate(U1, U2, , . . . , UK)
6 Uˆold ← U1
7 for k ← 2, 3, . . . , K do
8 Uˆnew ← ∅
9 for (Aˆ, Bˆ) ∈ Uˆold do
10 for (A, B) ∈ Uk do
11 if B ∩ Bˆ 6= ∅ then
/* A k-clique is found; add it as a pseudo node with the intersection of
two boxes. */
12 Uˆnew ← Uˆnew ∪ {(A ∪ Aˆ, B ∩ Bˆ)}
13 end
14 end
15 Uˆold ← Uˆnew
16 end
17 Uˆ ← ∅
18 for (A,B) ∈ Uˆnew do
19 if CheckClique(B, d, p, p) then
/* After finding all the k-cliques, we need to recheck whether these cliques have
intersection with the `p perturbation ball around the example x. */
20 Uˆ ← Uˆ ∪ {(A,B)}
21 end
22 return Uˆ
23 end
24 Function CheckClique(B, d, p, )
25 dist← minz∈B‖z − x‖pp using Proposition 1
26 if dist < p then
27 return false
28 return true
29 end
